The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a symmetrickey encryption standard adopted by the U.S. government. The standard comprises three block ciphers, AES128, AES192 and AES256, adopted from a larger collection originally published as Rijndael. Each of these ciphers has a 128bit block size, with key sizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits, respectively. The AES ciphers have been analyzed extensively and are now used worldwide, as was the case with its predecessor,^{[1]} the Data Encryption Standard (DES).
AES was announced by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as U.S. FIPS PUB 197 (FIPS 197) on November 26, 2001 after a 5year standardization process in which fifteen competing designs were presented and evaluated before Rijndael was selected as the most suitable (see Advanced Encryption Standard process for more details). It became effective as a Federal government standard on May 26, 2002 after approval by the Secretary of Commerce. It is available in many different encryption packages. AES is the first publicly accessible and open cipher approved by the NSA for top secret information (see Security of AES, below).
The Rijndael cipher was developed by two Belgian cryptographers, Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, and submitted by them to the AES selection process. Rijndael (pronounced "Rhine dall") is a wordplay with the names of the two inventors.^{[2]}^{[3]}
Description of the cipher Edit
AES is based on a design principle known as a Substitution permutation network. It is fast in both software and hardware.^{[4]} Unlike its predecessor, DES, AES does not use a Feistel network.
AES has a fixed block size of 128 bits and a key size of 128, 192, or 256 bits, whereas Rijndael can be specified with block and key sizes in any multiple of 32 bits, with a minimum of 128 bits. The blocksize has a maximum of 256 bits, but the keysize has no theoretical maximum.
AES operates on a 4×4 array of bytes, termed the state (versions of Rijndael with a larger block size have additional columns in the state). Most AES calculations are done in a special finite field.
The AES cipher is specified as a number of repetitions of transformation rounds that convert the input plaintext into the final output of ciphertext. Each round consists of several processing steps, including one that depends on the encryption key. A set of reverse rounds are applied to transform ciphertext back into the original plaintext using the same encryption key.
Highlevel description of the algorithm Edit
 KeyExpansion—round keys are derived from the cipher key using Rijndael's key schedule
 Initial Round
 AddRoundKey—each byte of the state is combined with the round key using bitwise xor
 Rounds
 SubBytes—a nonlinear substitution step where each byte is replaced with another according to a lookup table.
 ShiftRows—a transposition step where each row of the state is shifted cyclically a certain number of steps.
 MixColumns—a mixing operation which operates on the columns of the state, combining the four bytes in each column.
 AddRoundKey
 Final Round (no MixColumns)
 SubBytes
 ShiftRows
 AddRoundKey
The SubBytes step Edit
In the SubBytes step, each byte in the array is updated using an 8bit substitution box, the Rijndael Sbox. This operation provides the nonlinearity in the cipher. The Sbox used is derived from the multiplicative inverse over GF(2^{8}), known to have good nonlinearity properties. To avoid attacks based on simple algebraic properties, the Sbox is constructed by combining the inverse function with an invertible affine transformation. The Sbox is also chosen to avoid any fixed points (and so is a derangement), and also any opposite fixed points.
The ShiftRows step Edit
The ShiftRows step operates on the rows of the state; it cyclically shifts the bytes in each row by a certain offset. For AES, the first row is left unchanged. Each byte of the second row is shifted one to the left. Similarly, the third and fourth rows are shifted by offsets of two and three respectively. For the block of size 128 bits and 192 bits the shifting pattern is the same. In this way, each column of the output state of the ShiftRows step is composed of bytes from each column of the input state. (Rijndael variants with a larger block size have slightly different offsets). In the case of the 256bit block, the first row is unchanged and the shifting for second, third and fourth row is 1 byte, 3 bytes and 4 bytes respectively  this change only applies for the Rijndael cipher when used with a 256bit block, as AES does not use 256bit blocks.
The MixColumns step Edit
In the MixColumns step, the four bytes of each column of the state are combined using an invertible linear transformation. The MixColumns function takes four bytes as input and outputs four bytes, where each input byte affects all four output bytes. Together with ShiftRows, MixColumns provides diffusion in the cipher.
During this operation, each column is multiplied by the known matrix that for the 128 bit key is
 $ \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 \end{bmatrix}. $
The multiplication operation is defined as: multiplication by 1 means leaving unchanged, multiplication by 2 means shifting byte to the left and multiplication by 3 means shifting to the left and then performing xor with the initial unshifted value. After shifting, a conditional xor with 0x1B should be performed if the shifted value is larger than 0xFF.
In more general sense, each column is treated as a polynomial over GF(2^{8}) and is then multiplied modulo x^{4}+1 with a fixed polynomial c(x) = 0x03 ยท x^{3} + x^{2} + x + 0x02. The coefficients are displayed in their hexadecimal equivalent of the binary representation of bit polynomials from GF(2)[x]. The MixColumns step can also be viewed as a multiplication by a particular MDS matrix in a finite field. This process is described further in the article Rijndael mix columns.
The AddRoundKey step Edit
In the AddRoundKey step, the subkey is combined with the state. For each round, a subkey is derived from the main key using Rijndael's key schedule; each subkey is the same size as the state. The subkey is added by combining each byte of the state with the corresponding byte of the subkey using bitwise XOR.
Optimization of the cipher Edit
On systems with 32bit or larger words, it is possible to speed up execution of this cipher by combining SubBytes and ShiftRows with MixColumns, and transforming them into a sequence of table lookups. This requires four 256entry 32bit tables, which utilizes a total of four kilobytes (4096 bytes) of memory—one kilobyte for each table. A round can now be done with 16 table lookups and 12 32bit exclusiveor operations, followed by four 32bit exclusiveor operations in the AddRoundKey step.^{[5]}
If the resulting four kilobyte table size is too large for a given target platform, the table lookup operation can be performed with a single 256entry 32bit (i.e. 1 kilobyte) table by the use of circular rotates.
Using a byteoriented approach, it is possible to combine the SubBytes, ShiftRows, and MixColumns steps into a single round operation.
Security Edit
Until May 2009, the only successful published attacks against the full AES were sidechannel attacks on some specific implementations. The National Security Agency (NSA) reviewed all the AES finalists, including Rijndael, and stated that all of them were secure enough for U.S. Government nonclassified data. In June 2003, the U.S. Government announced that AES may be used to protect classified information:
The design and strength of all key lengths of the AES algorithm (i.e., 128, 192 and 256) are sufficient to protect classified information up to the SECRET level. TOP SECRET information will require use of either the 192 or 256 key lengths. The implementation of AES in products intended to protect national security systems and/or information must be reviewed and certified by NSA prior to their acquisition and use."^{[6]}
AES has 10 rounds for 128bit keys, 12 rounds for 192bit keys, and 14 rounds for 256bit keys. By 2006, the best known attacks were on 7 rounds for 128bit keys, 8 rounds for 192bit keys, and 9 rounds for 256bit keys.^{[7]}
Known attacksEdit
For cryptographers, a cryptographic "break" is anything faster than an exhaustive search. Thus, an XSL attack against a 128bitkey AES requiring 2^{100} operations (compared to 2^{128} possible keys) would be considered a break. The largest successful publiclyknown brute force attack has been against a 64bit RC5 key by distributed.net.^{[8]}
Unlike most other block ciphers, AES has a very neat algebraic description.^{[9]} In 2002, a theoretical attack, termed the "XSL attack", was announced by Nicolas Courtois and Josef Pieprzyk, purporting to show a weakness in the AES algorithm due to its simple description.^{[10]} Since then, other papers have shown that the attack as originally presented is unworkable; see XSL attack on block ciphers.
During the AES process, developers of competing algorithms wrote of Rijndael, "...we are concerned about [its] use...in securitycritical applications."^{[11]} However, at the end of the AES process, Bruce Schneier, a developer of the competing algorithm Twofish, wrote that while he thought successful academic attacks on Rijndael would be developed someday, "I do not believe that anyone will ever discover an attack that will allow someone to read Rijndael traffic."^{[12]}
On July 1, 2009, Bruce Schneier blogged^{[13]} about a relatedkey attack on the 192bit and 256bit versions of AES, discovered by Alex Biryukov and Dmitry Khovratovich,^{[14]} which exploits AES's somewhat simple key schedule and has a complexity of 2^{99.5}. This is a followup to an attack discovered earlier in 2009 by Alex Biryukov, Dmitry Khovratovich, and Ivica Nikoliฤ, with a complexity of 2^{96} for one out of every 2^{35} keys.^{[15]} Another attack was blogged by Bruce Schneier^{[16]} on July 30, 2009 and released as a preprint^{[17]} on August 3, 2009. This new attack, by Alex Biryukov, Orr Dunkelman, Nathan Keller, Dmitry Khovratovich, and Adi Shamir, is against AES256 that uses only two related keys and 2^{39} time to recover the complete 256bit key of a 9round version, or 2^{45} time for a 10round version with a stronger type of related subkey attack, or 2^{70} time for a 11round version. 256bit AES uses 14 rounds, so these attacks aren't effective against full AES.
In November 2009, the first knownkey distinguishing attack against a reduced 8round version of AES128 was released as a preprint.^{[18]} This knownkey distinguishing attack is an improvement of the rebound or the startfromthemiddle attacks for AESlike permutations, which view two consecutive rounds of permutation as the application of a socalled SuperSbox. It works on the 8round version of AES128, with a computation complexity of 2^{48}, and a memory complexity of 2^{32}.
In July 2010 Vincent Rijmen published an ironic paper on "chosenkeyrelationsinthemiddle" attacks on AES128.^{[19]}
Sidechannel attacks Edit
Sidechannel attacks do not attack the underlying cipher and so have nothing to do with its security as described here, but attack implementations of the cipher on systems which inadvertently leak data. There are several such known attacks on certain implementations of AES.
In April 2005, D.J. Bernstein announced a cachetiming attack that he used to break a custom server that used OpenSSL's AES encryption.^{[20]} The custom server was designed to give out as much timing information as possible (the server reports back the number of machine cycles taken by the encryption operation), and the attack required over 200 million chosen plaintexts.^{[21]}
In October 2005, Dag Arne Osvik, Adi Shamir and Eran Tromer presented a paper demonstrating several cachetiming attacks against AES.^{[22]} One attack was able to obtain an entire AES key after only 800 operations triggering encryptions, in a total of 65 milliseconds. This attack requires the attacker to be able to run programs on the same system or platform that is performing AES.
In December 2009 an attack on some hardware implementations was published that used Differential Fault Analysis and allows recovery of key with complexity of $ 2^{32} $.^{[23]}
FIPS validation Edit
The Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) is operated jointly by the United States Government's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Computer Security Division and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) of the Government of Canada. The use of validated cryptographic modules is required by the United States Government for all unclassified uses of cryptography. The Government of Canada also recommends the use of FIPS 140 validated cryptographic modules in unclassified applications of its departments.
Although NIST publication 197 ("FIPS 197") is the unique document that covers the AES algorithm, vendors typically approach the CMVP under FIPS 140 and ask to have several algorithms (such as Triple DES or SHA1) validated at the same time. Therefore, it is rare to find cryptographic modules that are uniquely FIPS 197 validated and NIST itself does not generally take the time to list FIPS 197 validated modules separately on its public web site. Instead, FIPS 197 validation is typically just listed as an "FIPS approved: AES" notation (with a specific FIPS 197 certificate number) in the current list of FIPS 140 validated cryptographic modules.
FIPS validation is challenging to achieve both technically and fiscally. There is a standardized battery of tests as well as an element of source code review that must be passed over a period of several days. The cost to perform these tests through an approved laboratory can be significant (e.g., well over $30,000 US)Template:Citation needed and does not include the time it takes to write, test, document and prepare a module for validation. After validation, modules must be resubmitted and reevaluated if they are changed in any way.
Test vectors Edit
Test vectors are a set of known ciphers for a given input and key. NIST distributes the reference of AES test vectors as AES Known Answer Test (KAT) Vectors (in ZIP format).
Implementations Edit
 Main article: AES implementations
See also Edit
 Advanced Encryption Standard process
 AES implementations
 AES instruction set for Intel and AMD microprocessors
 Data Encryption Standard (DES)  AES replaced this standard
 Disk encryption
 Triple DES  AES made this standard obsolescent
 Whirlpool  hash function created by Vincent Rijmen and Paulo S. L. M. Barreto
Notes Edit
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 โ "Efficient software implementation of AES on 32bit platforms". Lecture Notes in Computer Science: 2523. 2003
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 โ John Kelsey, Stefan Lucks, Bruce Schneier, Mike Stay, David Wagner, and Doug Whiting, Improved Cryptanalysis of Rijndael, Fast Software Encryption, 2000 pp213–230 [1]
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 โ Bruce Schneier, AES Announced, October 15, 2000
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References Edit
 Nicolas Courtois, Josef Pieprzyk, "Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers with Overdefined Systems of Equations". pp267–287, ASIACRYPT 2002.
 Joan Daemen, Vincent Rijmen, "The Design of Rijndael: AES  The Advanced Encryption Standard." Springer, 2002. ISBN 3540425802.
 Christof Paar, Jan Pelzl, "The Advanced Encryption Standard", Chapter 4 of "Understanding Cryptography, A Textbook for Students and Practitioners". Springer, 2009.
External links Edit
 FIPS PUB 197: the official AES standard (PDF file)
 AES algorithm archive information  (old, unmaintained)
 Animation of the AES encryption process
 Fully Functional Animation of the AES encryption process and key expansion (128 bits)  based on the work of Enrique Zabala (previous link)
 Stick Figure Guide to AES, a layman introduction to cryptography and AES.
 Accelerating AES in software by using custom instructions (PDF file)
